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Abstract
This article examines emerging governance practices in the REDD (Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) initiative. We examine three different gen-
eral governance practices (neoliberal, post-national, and government-led practices) that
have been applied in the interaction between international organizations and two REDD
target countries: Mozambique and Tanzania. In these countries, we ﬁnd that emerging
REDD+ governance practices are a mixture of international organizations’ procedural
practices and the target country’s established governance practices, whereas neoliberal
practices are weakly expressed. These ﬁndings call into question the simpliﬁed assump-
tion of reduced state authority.
In the Copenhagen Climate Summit of 2009, REDD (Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation) was chosen as one of the major instru-
ments in ﬁghting climate change. In the REDD scheme, developing countries
can contribute to the mitigation targets of the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) by trading carbon assets stored in their forests on
global carbon markets or through direct transactions from developed to devel-
oping countries. This reﬂects a compromise between many different interests.
For developed countries, it is the answer to the question of how to include de-
veloping countries in efforts aimed at mitigating greenhouse gases (GHGs). For
developing countries, it is a novel way to fund climate-related development. For
business, it is an opportunity to broaden the carbon trade business in new mar-
kets; for the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), a possibility to enforce
civil society and include the voice of local people in environmental conservation
and development. Several different environmental and social aspects have since
been linked to the original idea of carbon storage in forests, which is now called
REDD+ (Haug and Gupta 2013, 80–81; McDermott et al. 2011; Pistorius 2012).
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Though the REDD concept is well-studied, except for pilot projects it has
yet to produce a functioning practice at the national level in any country. Aside
from rich general studies on REDD governance (den Besten et al. 2014; Doherty
and Schroeder 2011; Gupta 2012; Gupta et al. 2013a; Hayes and Persha 2010;
Kashwan 2015; Murdiyarso et al. 2012; Olander et al. 2012; Somorin et al.
2012), ﬁeld studies and critical assessments are available for some African
countries, notably Mozambique and Tanzania—hence, our present focus (e.g.,
Beymer-Farris and Bassett 2012; Mustalahti et al. 2012; Mwakalobo et al. 2011;
Nhantumbo 2011; Robinson et al. 2013; Sitoe et al. 2012). In this study, we
investigate governance practices linked to REDD’s purposes, particularly prac-
tices that address the positions of states, nonstate actors, and international or-
ganizations (IOs) regarding governance. We understand practice to be a routine
activity, not an idiosyncratic one, meaning that our analysis focuses not on ac-
tors’ intentions but only on their actions. Practice is “[an] ensemble of doings,
sayings and things in a speciﬁc ﬁeld of activity” (Arts et al. 2014, 6). It is an
established discourse, connected to international and national governance activ-
ities. As such, practices—not intentions—are considered constitutive (Adler and
Pouliot 2011, 7; Swidler 2001, 84–85).
Den Besten et al. (2014) have examined how international discourses have
molded REDD to REDD+. Following this, we analyze how discursive national
governance practices concur with global climate governance, namely by examin-
ing how the UNFCCC’s REDD initiative has been transformed into national
practices in Mozambique and Tanzania. In this context, practice does not refer
to project implementation, but to documented practices in forest governance,
whereby countries prepare for REDD+ implementation. In this sense, the key
question is how these practices were adapted to accommodate national practices.
The next section of this article discusses practice in the context of REDD+ by
locating REDD+ amid the general situation of global climate change and
development practices advocated by, for example, the UNFCCC, the World Bank
(WB), and UN agencies. By drawing on theoretical literature and research address-
ing environmental governance and forest policies, including REDD studies, we ar-
ticulate three basic hypotheses regarding how governance practices are structured.
In the third section, we examine the realization of these governance models in
REDD readiness processes in Mozambique and Tanzania, focusing on ofﬁcial doc-
uments. We study how the practices promoted by IOs reformulate the practices
inscribed in national processes through key tools, including the Readiness Prepa-
ration Proposal (R-PP) process promoted by the WB, national REDD+ strategies,
and different safeguard standards that the IOs use to guide and review the adap-
tation of international social and environmental concerns in national practices.
International Climate Change Governance Practices and REDD+
The discussion about ﬁnancing REDD, which ranges from market-based mech-
anisms for offsetting emissions to approaches based on ﬁnancing by external
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funds, underscores the lack of coherence in the debate of REDD governance
(McAffee 2012; Pistorius 2012; West 2010). In response, several different
hypotheses are necessary to examine the REDD initiative in its sundry variations
and developments within the UNFCCC process (Gupta et al. 2013b). In this
study, we reduce the discussion to three hypothetical types of practices: neo-
liberal, postnational, and government-led.
These three practices are drawn from theoretical debates on the role of
the state in the globalizing world. They are meta-discourses that can be
found in different spheres of environmental governance (Pülzl et al.
2014). Although discussion on the changing role of the state started from
developed, industrialized countries, it has also been applied in developing
countries. Basically, the debate is divided into two parts: the decrease of the
state’s role in (neoliberal) globalization, and its changing role (“hollowing”
of the state) in the globalization process. The ﬁrst issue is seen as particu-
larly relevant in development studies when the international funding insti-
tutions’ (IFIs) policies support marketization, privatization, and cuts in the
public sector (Peck and Tickell 2002). The second approach more empha-
sizes changes in the roles of the governments and states within the process
(Jessop 2004; Rhodes 1994).
When understanding these hypothetical categories as practices, we try to
avoid the idea that certain policies represent purposeful intention. Quite the
opposite—we suppose that organizations, governments, and business follow
practices. Strongly established practices can be considered institutions, but they
are, at the same time, socially and historically contingent. They are not inevi-
table, although they are continuous and stable (Arts et al. 2014, 5).
By dividing three governance practices into four dimensions according to
the model developed by Swidler (2001) and Sending and Neumann (2011), we
ﬁrst suggest that REDD+ implementation consists of a set of procedural prac-
tices originating from general climate change and development practices. In
effect, these procedural practices limit more concrete actions known as anchoring
practices. In the case of climate change and development, the principle known as
common but differentiated responsibilities (CDR) guides general practice for devel-
oping countries in mitigating climate change. Any implementation in a partic-
ular area—here, the REDD+ process—constitutes a procedural practice. In REDD
they answer the question of how the connection to the CDR is made. The pro-
cedural practices adopted by REDD+ divide the process into different ap-
proaches, for which the general starting point is mitigation. International
discourse from REDD to REDD+ incorporated adaptation and socioeconomic
development (den Besten et al. 2014). There are differences in the procedural
practices between the three types of governance practices. The emphases of dif-
ferent procedural practices take more concrete shape at the level of anchoring
practices, which pertain only to a certain domain focusing on a speciﬁc com-
munity, such as IOs and governments. In the case of REDD, anchoring prac-
tices indicate (1) how the connection between national measures and global
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institutions is made, (2) what the practices of carbon sequestration and mitiga-
tion are, (3) how these practical measures are funded, (4) how various actors
form national REDD governance, and (5) what links forest conservation to
development. In their implementation, anchoring practices fan out into a greater
number of more concrete, speciﬁc practices (Sending and Neumann 2011).
Anchoring practices take a crucial place in this study because they show how
shared general procedural practices can lead to dissimilar concrete, speciﬁc
practices.
Neoliberal, Postnational, and Government-Led REDD Practices
In climate change governance, the starting point of the neoliberal approach is the
commodiﬁcation of carbon, which enables climate change mitigation through
carbon markets (Lansing 2011). In REDD governance, neoliberal anchoring
practices focus on mitigation through conservation, in which the connection to
global market institutions is made through private and semi-public institutions,
which harmonize the standards and principles for carbon trade (Stephan 2012).
The main instruments for promoting large-scale forest conservation for carbon
sequestration are economic incentives to forest owners and tenure holders to
facilitate their participation in global carbon markets. Thus, conservation ﬁnanc-
ing occurs by selling carbon assets to global markets, which is also expected to
solve problems with local socioeconomic development (McAffee 2012).
The neoliberal approach involves rule by markets, which suggests that
all resources should be valued and priced via market mechanisms. Such rule
is assumed to function properly only when property rights are clearly deﬁned
under private ownership and the state’s role is limited through deregulation
(Peck and Tickell 2002). In this system, the state’s role is to maintain essential
judicial institutions to guarantee the market function, while inevitable minimal
regulation is provided voluntarily by the private sector (Holmes 2011; Humphreys
2009, 320). Voluntary participation that replaces control by public authorities is
therefore seen to be an organic part of the neoliberal approach (Humphreys
2003). The IOs’ practices establish neoliberal discourse globally, and their
role in this framework is that of a panopticon for controlling the implementation
of neoliberal policies worldwide (Arsel and Büscher 2012).
Critical studies have argued that the general ﬂaw of neoliberal environ-
mental governance is its narrow view of conservation (Brockington and Duffy
2010; Castree 2008a; Castree 2008b; Igoe and Brockington 2007), particularly
in developing countries (Fletcher 2012; Milne and Adams 2012). Strong sup-
port for neoliberal REDD governance appears in the REDD initiative itself, as
well as in different submissions presented by a group of non-Annex countries
at COP 11. However, the spectrum of REDD proposals in COP 11 includes both
market-based and non-market-based initiatives, though most are variations of the
“commodiﬁcation of forest carbon stock for market-based governance” approach
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(Corbera 2012, 613; Okereke and Dooley 2010). Such revisions of the neoliberal
doctrine in development practice can be called “inclusive neoliberalism” (Ruckert
2006) or “hybrid neoliberalism” (Peck and Tickell 2002, 383), because the
doctrine cannot solve wider social and environmental issues. Therefore, new
approaches, such as civil society engagement and participatory approaches, have
become necessary (McCarthy 2005). These and other extensive revisions are par-
ticularly apparent under REDD+, in which a market-based system is less visible
than in the original submissions (Okereke and Dooley 2010).
The emergence of the new aspects into market-based governance and, in
fact, the different globalization tendencies call for increasing regulation, which
is difﬁcult to explore from a pure market perspective. Following Habermas
(2001), we call the second hypothetical ensemble of established activities
“postnational governance practices.” Where neoliberal approaches derive gov-
ernance practices from market practices, postnational approaches constitute
global multilevel governance as a new phenomenon. Accordingly, international
standards, which are essential parts of current governance practices and cannot
be drawn purely from market practices, actually stem from different networks
and new political units, including nongovernmental actors. By the same token,
the role of states has not vanished, but instead has changed (Jessop 2004;
Rhodes 1994). The emergence of nonstate actors from both civil society and
the private sector, in domains traditionally reserved for public authorities and
supranational regulations, characterizes the new practices. Initially, the concept
of postnational was not based on the idea of market domination in social life,
but on the complex structures of global governance, including the IOs’ promo-
tion of marketization, democratization, and civil society participation (Habermas
2001; Hedrick 2007; Scheuerman 2008).
The emerging practices of REDD reformulate the market-based vision to
comply with the practice of a complex global climate and development network
(see Haug and Gupta 2013). In postnational conditions, national practices occur
within the limits of international regulation, whether the practices concern carbon
trade institutions (such as monitoring procedures agreed in the UNFCCC process)
or environmental and social safeguards established by the UN and WB. The
connection of national practices to global institutions is made by common
standards and by related monitoring, reporting, and verifying (MRV) practices
already established by the UNFCCC (CDM Rulebook 2012; see also UNFCCC
2012, 4). Global governance practices are not, however, immune to national dis-
cussions, which particularly feed back into the discussion about the framework
for various approaches (FVA) under the UNFCCC, which has meant the recog-
nition of different national funding mechanisms for REDD+ (ENB 2015).
Another aspect deriving from the postnational condition is that global
concerns and their solutions (e.g., REDD) can lead to local problems, such as
limited livelihood and population transfer, known as “glocal” problems, which
call for broader local, national, and international solutions (Gupta et al. 2013b,
231–238). For REDD speciﬁcally, the danger is that a new inﬂux of investment
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and competing interests for forest resources will compromise the rights of local
communities (Dooley et al. 2011; Nhantumbo 2011; Odgaard and Maganga
2009). In response, IOs have developed procedural civil society engagement
practices and safeguards to include local communities’ interests in governance
and ensure that investments do not create negative outcomes. In 2010 the
parties to the UNFCCC agreed to a procedural practice consisting of seven safe-
guards, known as the Cancun Safeguards, that deﬁne broad criteria and princi-
ples to help developing countries establish and implement national safeguards
to enhance the role of international standards in the REDD+ process (Daviet
and Larsen 2012, 18–19; Herbertson 2012, 11).
Postnational practices emphasize the delegation of authority between dif-
ferent national and international, and private and public, actors. Though the
state’s retreat is apparent, it is not inevitable; instead, the new paradigm suggests
that state actions are no longer deﬁned by the sovereignty principle and national
interests alone. Currently, states take shape within global networks characterized
by increasing global regulations. However, whether or not governance practices
are postnational on a domestic level is debatable. In many cases current con-
crete governance practices do not resonate with discursive postnational anchor-
ing practices in developing countries, but instead with government-led practices.
This type of practice—government-led—is ostensibly opposite the other
two. In general, government-led practice is based on the idea that although
IOs prefer neoliberal economic policies, their power is not decisive; as such, atten-
tion should focus on a country’s existing power structures (Sangmpam 2007).
Several scholars have noted that REDD plans and applications do not suggest
the emergence of market-based forest governance, but rather, increasing attempts
of governments to strengthen their grip on national forest resources. One plau-
sible reason for this is that global REDD governance is already fragmented,
which gives plenty of space for national governments to develop national REDD
projects (Gupta 2012; Haug and Gupta 2013) and reinforce their role over civil
society and the market (Phelps et al. 2010; Robinson et al. 2013). Similarly, the
main institutional alternative to market-based mechanisms—namely, multilateral
climate funds that allocate resources to national funds—gives governments an
opportunity to dominate the REDD process (Streck 2012). In short, the emphasis
on the public sector suggests that government-led practice runs counter to neolib-
eral REDD governance.
In government-led approaches, the state’s retreat is relative, meaning that
sovereignty claims now appear as another form of global regulation. For example,
the REDD+ process emphasizes the state’s role in facilitating carbon trade, which
also suggests that authorities have a strong grip on forest management (Phelps
et al. 2010). Global regulation may limit state and private actors, yet it also
reinforces the state’s role as a domestic actor, thereby stressing the state’s traditional
role as legislator, not facilitator. From this point of view, governments tend to
accommodate IO policies into their prevailing development policies. Although
states are willing to take part in GHG mitigation via the carbon trade, they insist
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that ﬁnancing forest conservation should occur through national funds, arguably
to guarantee that the volatility of carbon asset prices does not endanger the
country’s development goals (Makundi 2011, 194–196; Nhamo and Bimha 2011,
118–123).
REDD governance models can be clariﬁed by scrutinizing the ways in which
the REDD practices promoted by IOs are expressed in national documents. IO
policies address these kinds of governance models to varying degrees. Tradition-
ally, the WB has emphasized public-private partnerships and marketization as
part of the integration into global governance, whereas UN agencies have paid
more attention to the development of social and environmental safeguards to
regulate the globalization processes. When recipient countries apply IO-promoted
policies by combining different practices, a distinct governance model unlike the
original may emerge. These models do not appear in any pure form, however,
but as a combination of different, sometimes contradictory, practices (Table 1).
The Mozambican REDD Practices
The REDD process in Mozambique began in 2008 when the Ministry of Agri-
culture (MINAG) developed and submitted a Readiness Project Idea Note (R-
PIN) to the WB’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). Initially, the work
advanced on two tracks: toward preparation of the R-PP for the FCPF led by
MINAG, and toward a national REDD+ strategy to inform the implementation
of pilot projects led by the Ministry of Environment (MICOA), funded mainly
by Norway.1 However, in early 2010 the government decided to halt the R-PP
process to focus on the national strategy, of which a draft version was ready
in August 2010. In early 2011, the government again revised its approach and
decided to proceed with preparation of the R-PP (Sitoe et al. 2012). A ﬁnal
version was approved in early 2012, thereby releasing FCPF initial funding
for the implementation process (World Bank 2013). In the interim, “further
development of the national strategy was paused in order to align its further
improvement and ﬁnalization after the FCPF-R-PP process was started” (RM
2013b, 90). Some powerful actors, such as the Council of Ministers and private
companies, have been eager to accelerate the process, but voluntary market-
based pilot projects have proved disappointing, due to the volatility of carbon
markets. Other actors, including many civil society organizations (CSOs), are
critical because they fear that forest-dependent communities will suffer, although
the Mozambican CSO ﬁeld is divided over the issue (CIP and AWEPA 2012; Quan
et al. 2014). After a large preparation grant was received from theWB inmid-2013,
the process has been under close WB guidance. In late 2013 a decree (70/2013;
RM 2013a) that establishes procedures to approve REDD+ projects was enacted
and published, and the preparatory work has been largely shifted to private
1. Since January 2015, the two ministries have been merged under the new Ministry for Land,
Environment, and Rural Development.
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consultants (FCPF 2014).2 The draft national strategy (henceforth “the strategy”)
and the R-PP have been the key documents for REDD in Mozambique.
The strategy’s weak connection to global institutions refers to government-
led practice. The strategy puts very little emphasis on technical and operational
aspects, such as MRV, which are condensed into three pages. Among the re-
sources to be disbursed via the REDD+ fund, only 20 percent are allocated
for operations, including the realization of MRV at the national level, while
80 percent are directed to investments in communities and other supporting
activities such as research and afforestation (MICOA 2011). Such low emphasis
does not seem to recognize the importance of technical capacities in REDD+
implementation (Sitoe et al. 2012, 4), which receives much more space in the
2. The decree is one of the ﬁrst of this type of legislation in the world. A project license allows the
holder to apply for international carbon credit certiﬁcation and sell the credits on voluntary
markets, and to have preferential treatment when the REDD+ legal framework is approved
(RM 2013a, Art. 27).
Q3Table 1
Governance Practices of REDD+
Practice Neoliberal Postnational Government-Led
General practice CDR CDR CDR
Procedural practice Mitigation
through
marketization
Mitigation,
adaptation,
socioeconomic
development
Voluntary mitigation,
adaptation,
socioeconomic
development
Anchoring practices
Connection to
global institutions
MRV, public
and private
institutions of
carbon trade
MRV, UNFCCC
institutions
Through existing
public institutions
Principles of
carbon sequestration
and mitigation
Privatization of
forest resources,
commercial
forestry
Mixed public
and private
measures
Byproducts of
socioeconomic
development
Principles of funding Market-based Various
approaches
Financing through
national funds
Principles of governance Markets and
civil society
Public and
civil society
Government
(+civil society)
Principles of development Market-driven Safeguards Development
assistance
Note: CDR: Common but different responsibilities; MRV: monitoring, reporting, and verifying
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R-PP. The R-PP discourse on local communities, by contrast, focuses on services
the communities can provide, such as ensuring collective action and reducing
illegal activities, as well as raising awareness. Their role in the more technical
aspects of REDD, including MRV, is limited to collecting secondary data to
strengthen local ownership, while the government’s technical monitoring capac-
ity is strengthened through a bilateral project with Japan (FCPF 2014; RM
2013b).
In contrast to the strategy, which is critical of the potential harmful effects
of large-scale commercial carbon sequestration projects (MICOA 2011), the R-PP
tends to blame the rural population for deforestation and the leakage problem.
Through REDD+, communities are expected to gradually reduce deforestation
and receive beneﬁts from forest products and environmental services. To achieve
such targets, they should be assisted to improve their “primitive” agricultural
methods and abandon the practice of shifting cultivation, as well as adopt
new technologies that make wood energy production and usage more sustain-
able. In strategic actions, the R-PP prioritizes private-sector options, such as
large-scale commercial agriculture investments and small and medium enter-
prises (RM 2013b).
Securing ownership rights to land and carbon stocks is considered crucial
to the entire process. Both the strategy and the R-PP recognize that, despite a
relatively sound legal and policy framework, weak law enforcement and policy
implementation constitute a major stumbling block for REDD+. Problems are
considered particularly acute for communal lands, because transparent concrete
practices for negotiations between local communities and investors are lacking
(MICOA 2011; RM 2013b). Interestingly, the new decree separates carbon credits
from land tenure (RM 2013a, Arts. 1, 5).
The issue of property rights is closely tied to funding the REDD+ process.
The strategy links carbon sequestration with broader national development
goals, noting that the state already recognizes community land rights and thus
should also recognize rural communities’ rights to carbon and related beneﬁts.
In the case of private enterprises’ carbon credit sales on voluntary carbon markets,
the strategy stipulates that 60–80 percent of receiptsmust go to local communities.
At the same time, it highlights other government-led premises, such as national
ownership and management of REDD+ ﬁnancial resources by way of a national
fund administered by a Mozambican bank (MICOA 2011).
Following the neoliberal tenets of the R-PP, funding via various, preferably
market-based, mechanisms should be tested and evaluated by piloting private-
sector participation. Yet, while the R-PP recognizes that consultations during the
REDD+ preparation underscored that opportunity costs fall largely on local
communities and individuals, it maintains that the beneﬁts from REDD+ to
the local population should primarily materialize indirectly as a result of im-
proved access to social services, or else due to technical support and ﬁnancing
devoted to introducing technical improvements and new practices, not by direct
payments (RM 2013b). While recognizing communities along with national
Eero Palmujoki and Pekka Virtanen • 67
and foreign public or private actors (including CSOs and private persons) as
license holders, the new decree reﬂects a move toward postnational practices.
It leaves beneﬁt-sharing to market negotiations guided by further regulations,
stipulating only the distribution of the license fee and carbon credit tax (10%),
which will be divided between the government (80%) and local communities
(20%) (RM 2013a, Arts. 21, 33, 34).
The strategy emphasizes development goals and national ownership of
REDD, as well as the need to establish nationally deﬁned anchoring practices
for REDD governance. Crucial policy statements underscore that environmental
services, including carbon sequestration, belong to the sphere of national sover-
eignty and that REDD+ must pose beneﬁts to different segments of society, in
particular to rural communities. The proposed REDD+ National Council would
consist of representatives of various government directorates, civil society and
research institutions, and one representative of the private sector (MICOA 2011).
In contrast, the R-PP calls for more substantial private-sector representation in
REDD+ decision-making bodies, including that of organizations established for
community participation (RM 2013b). In this sense, it stresses neoliberal, business-
based, market-driven governance, whereas the strategy emphasizes public manage-
ment with CSO engagement. Themain supervisory body established in the decree,
the REDD+ Technical Review Committee—which consists of 13 representatives
of the government, six of civil society, three of research institutions, and two of
the private sector (RM 2013a, Art. 10)—reﬂects the latter approach.
In terms of signiﬁcant anchoring practices regarding social and environ-
mental aspects of development, the strategy relies primarily on existing national
institutions, while the R-PP uses the Strategic Environmental and Social Assess-
ment (SESA) framework: the main technical instrument of the WB (MICOA
2011; RM 2013b). In the Mozambican REDD process, the R-PP requires the
development of a detailed plan of consultation within SESA using the FCPF
framework, which has been in preparation since January 2013. The chief output
of the process is the development of safeguards to minimize the negative impacts
of REDD+ implementation (FCPF 2014; RM 2013b, 102, 148). In this context,
the R-PP seconds criticism of the way that existing national mechanisms, such as
the public consultations required for natural resource initiatives in Mozambique,
have been conducted, since these mechanisms sometimes involve manipulation
and investor-based corruption, or else raise unfulﬁlled expectations of beneﬁts
for local communities (RM 2013b, 34). However, the same criticism has been
leveled against the consultation processes led by theWB, including that “the FCPF’s
rules and commitments are largely conﬁned to procedural rights to participation
and consultation, rather than respecting substantive rights to land, livelihoods,
and resources” (Dooley et al. 2011, 33). More broadly, the lack of capacity—and,
arguably, political will—to enforce the existing normative framework for natural
resource management, which the new decree also fails to address (Quan et al.
2014, 18), creates a major obstacle for translating the established anchoring prac-
tices into concrete practices.
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The Tanzanian REDD Practices
REDD preparations also began in Tanzania in 2008, when the government
reached an agreement with three chief donors. In ﬁnancial terms, the primary
donor was again Norway, which provides substantial funding for pilot pro-
grams addressing deforestation, developing methodologies for carbon account-
ing, promoting research and capacity building on climate change, enhancing
investments in sustainable forest management, and assisting Tanzania with pre-
paring for future REDD+ funding. In the same year, the R-PIN was developed
and submitted to the WB, precipitating its participation in the R-PP process,
though without WB funding. Following preparations made since 2008, Tanzania
has also been a member of the UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emis-
sions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries [UN-
REDD] National Programme (2009–2012).
Both Tanzania’s R-PP document and the ﬁrst draft of the national REDD+
strategy appeared in late 2010 (United Republic of Tanzania [URT] 2010a; URT
2010b). As in the case of Mozambique, the documents differ radically. The R-PP
is a highly technical report arguing the country’s readiness for REDD+, whereas
the ﬁrst strategy draft analyzes both the technical preconditions of REDD+ and
the possible social consequences of carbon sequestration and the commerciali-
zation of forest conservation, including beneﬁt sharing with local and forest-
dependent people. It also takes a critical attitude toward Tanzania’s administrative
capacity to realize REDD+ (URT 2010b). Interestingly, the second strategy draft,
which appeared in mid-2012, and the ﬁnal version, from March 2013, follow
the technical approach of the R-PP and emphasize the use of existing forest
management structures and governance systems. The most important addition
in the ﬁnal version, relative to the second draft, is a closer examination of social
and environmental safeguards, possibly added after IO consultations (URT 2012;
URT 2013a).
In both the R-PP and strategy documents, the connection of REDD+ activi-
ties to global institutions is viewed primarily from a technical perspective. Due
to carbon trading and its preconditions, the second drafted strategy emphasizes
in particular the technical nature of some practices, such as MRV. In general, the
practices are based on UNFCCC and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
good practice guidelines and form a national monitoring system involving data
collection, modeling, and locating carbon emissions by geographic information
systems. The draft further concludes that establishing a robust MRV system is a
precondition for ﬁnalizing other system-based elements, including market- and
regulation-enabling systems. The global governance structure of the Tanzanian
REDD is obvious in the UN-REDD Programme Document, where the multilevel
governance approach is clear and the global climate targets are monitored and
managed through national and international bodies, including the Tanzanian
Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT), the UN-REDD Policy Body,
and the WB’s FCPF participants’ committee (UN-REDD 2009).
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In the ﬁnal version of the strategy, the weight in strategic implementation
is placed on strengthening existing conservation and forest management struc-
tures. The most important measures would take place in the public sector, par-
ticularly with respect to MRV, yet would also regard ﬁnancial mechanisms and
incentive schemes for REDD, the most important of which would be a national
REDD+ trust fund (URT 2013a). The importance that the strategy documents
give to decentralization, privatization, and commercialization is surprisingly
weak. In fact, only one area of the strategic results considers the participation
of the private sector and civil society, which is slated to occur within the existing
participatory forest management (PFM) program (see Blomley and Iddi 2009).
The document also partly stresses commercialization, including the market pric-
ing of wood products and market-based forest certiﬁcation, though these incen-
tives are proposed to take place in the context of public forest governance,
which is the central objective (URT 2012; URT 2013a). In the R-PP, by contrast,
the role of nonstate actors is stronger, partly due to WB practices. The FCPF fol-
lows the WB’s general rules, which require the participation of civil society and
the private sector in the planning and realization of WB-funded undertakings
(URT 2010a).
All versions of the strategy are based on the fund model. This may reﬂect
an attempt to regulate carbon price through a national fund to guarantee a
stable income for conservation, but alternatively, it may simply reﬂect the cre-
ation of a market institution facilitated by the state. The government’s role is
highlighted in the coordination of REDD+ projects as the legislator and facili-
tator for REDD+, roles that are crucial for making changes in the land-tenure
system to provide secure land ownership for REDD+ schemes. Many other
REDD-related measures similarly strengthen the government’s grip on forest
management and conservation (URT 2010b; URT 2012; URT 2013a).
In Tanzania, the REDD+ process is led by the Vice President’s Ofﬁce, while
the MNRT (in the mainland) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (MANR, in Zanzibar) are the principal institutions in the REDD Task
Force. Compared with Mozambique, the main difference is civil society’s weak
participation; until 2012, only one national CSO representative was included in
the task force as an observer (Nhantumbo 2012). According to the strategy doc-
uments, local participation is to be achieved by the application of the PFM
approach on village and private lands and state forests. However, the greatest
problems posed by deforestation and the best opportunities for carbon storage
are in so-called “general land forests,” which constitute nearly half of the total
forest area in Tanzania and suffer from open access, yet lie beyond the domain
of PFM (URT 2010b).
In the R-PPmodel, the rules concerning civil society are ﬁrst procedural and
only secondly substantial (see Robinson et al. 2013). The governance system
according to R-PP is based on existing national and local bodies, although it
requires that some institutions, such as the National Climate Change Steering
Committee and the related technical committee, be broadened to include CSOs
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and the private sector, as well as local communities. However, theWB’s procedural
rules concerning the latter’s participation have not been translated into anchoring
practices in the R-PP. Though the REDD process recognizes the rights of indige-
nous and forest-dependent peoples, it makes no attempt to deﬁne said rights in
concrete terms, thereby making the procedural approach dubious (URT 2010a).
In contrast to the R-PP approach, the national strategy process has sought
to develop the Cancun Safeguards into a concrete policy as a means to alleviate
the social problems that international conservation interests have created. At
least the ﬁrst draft of the Tanzanian social and environmental standards (SES)
suggests this (URT 2013b). The Cancun Safeguards emphasize that national
legal and policy frameworks provide important environmental and social safe-
guards that apply to REDD+. In applying these criteria, the strategy addresses the
WB’s safeguard criteria and indicators, though the draft anticipates the emer-
gence of Tanzanian SES providing detailed criteria and indicators for how to
fulﬁll the eight social and environmental principles based on the seven Cancun
Safeguards topics (URT 2013a). The SES draft divides further preparation into
ten steps, the submission of the draft after public consultations being the sixth
(URT 2013b). Clearly, detailed indicators in the draft help identify the particu-
lar national anchoring practices concerning IO procedure. Together with the
national REDD strategy, SES form a distinguishable national REDD practice;
yet, as a draft the SES may change considerably, as happened with the ﬁrst
national strategy draft. Nonetheless, if the ﬁnal version of the safeguards follows
the outline of the ﬁrst draft, then Tanzania will have built a separate national
anchoring practice. In technical issues it follows the IOs’ procedural practices,
but in social issues it seeks to develop its own practices.
Conclusion: Mozambican and Tanzanian REDD+ Governance Practices
in Comparison
The analysis of Mozambican and Tanzanian national strategies and R-PP docu-
ments shows no consistent governance practices, but rather a mixture of IO
policies and national practices. Interestingly, Tanzania in particular provides
surprisingly weak connections to neoliberal environmental governance. The
Mozambican strategy document shows a similar de-emphasis; excluding the
Mozambican R-PP, the only anchoring practice in the strategy reﬂecting neoliberal
environmental governance is the emphasis on civil society and public-private con-
nections, which appears as an established procedure promoted by the WB to be
subsequently adapted to the existing governance structures. In both countries,
despite different participatory approaches practiced in REDD-related activities,
the governments’ grip is strong, leaving civil society and the private sector only
minor roles in national strategies. The Mozambican R-PP deviates from this
general line by highlighting a market-driven approach in carbon sequestration.
Table 2 reﬂects the initial dilemma faced by the governments in relation to
the IOs when developing national REDD anchoring practices. Overall, the way
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the strategy is addressed in the Mozambican R-PP reﬂects the contradiction be-
tween their own national-level anchoring practices and practices from dominant
IOs, such as the WB. While the strategy provides clear policy alignments on
various momentous issues, including beneﬁt-sharing mechanisms, institutional
arrangements, and resource-tenure reforms, the R-PP treats these government-
led approaches as potential, albeit poorly developed, alternatives that stand
on equal footing with neoliberal options (RM 2013b, 44–48, 83, 96–102).
The strategy is unmistakably inadequate in terms of its detailed plans for
REDD+ implementation. It does, however, provide a policy statement even
though the WB did not endorse it. The subsequent injection of external funding
from the WB and Japan, which resulted in the development of technical proce-
dures (MRV, SES) compatible with UNFCCC guidelines, as well as speciﬁc
REDD+ legislation, may reﬂect an emerging compromise in the form of postna-
tional practices. In this context, practices reﬂect the opportunities available in a
given situation of governments’ versus IOs’ and donors’ interests.
The Tanzanian REDD+ documents are more successful in reconciling
national strategy and the R-PP without compromising the government’s role in
the REDD+ process. The practices adopted to implement REDD+ essentially follow
the same practices observed in Tanzania’s environmental governance elsewhere,
Table 2
Mozambican and Tanzanian REDD+ Anchoring Practices
Anchoring Practice Neoliberal Postnational Government-Led
Connection to
global institutions
Tanzania
(NS1,2,3, R-PP)
Mozambique
(NS)
Principles of
carbon sequestration
and mitigation
Mozambique
(R-PP)
Tanzania
(R-PP)
Mozambique
(NS)
Tanzania
(NS1,2,3)
Principles of
funding
Mozambique
(R-PP)
Mozambique
(NS)
Tanzania
(NS1,2,3)
Tanzania
(R-PP)
Principles of
governance
Mozambique
(R-PP)
Tanzania
(NS3)
Mozambique
(NS)
Tanzania
(NS1)
Principles of
development
Mozambique
(R-PP)
NS (1,2,3): National REDD+ Strategy (Drafts 1, 2, and 3)
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such as in the PFM program. Doubtlessly, REDD has pressured the government to
commercialize and privatize the forest sector for carbon markets, though the
establishment of institutions of carbon trade, including the national fund and
theMRV system, as well as environmental and social safeguards, tend to strengthen
the government’s grip on environmental governance and forest management
(cf. Robinson et al. 2013).
As such, we are inclined to suggest, with certain reservations, that the
emphasis in our case studies falls more on government-led practices and, to
a certain extent, postnational practices. In the Mozambican strategy, the
connection to global institutions occurs through national institutions, and car-
bon sequestration is merely a side project of the overall development effort, not
a goal. This situation is, however, difﬁcult to reconcile with the market-driven
approach of the R-PP, although the recent development of standardized tech-
nical practices and a new legal framework, achieved with external funding, appears
to represent a compromise. In the Tanzanian case, though the government’s role
is dominant, the connection to global institutions and the role of mitigation
represent mixed practices. Both the national strategy and the R-PP reveal an appar-
ent goal of, and procedures for, mitigation, which are proposed to occur due to
public and privatemeasures by combining development and conservation policies
and mechanisms. In the case of funding, both countries base their REDD strategy
on national funding, which can be ﬁnanced by any combination of global climate
funds, private carbon trade schemes, and development assistance. However, at the
same time pilot projects drawing on voluntary carbon markets continue on the
side. To the extent that the REDD+ projects are funded, Tanzanian documents
suggest that the country’s development goals are secured by way of the safeguards,
despite large-scale conservation projects. In Mozambique, where the objectives
concerning mitigation are not as apparent as in Tanzania, the development of
safeguards with external funding is more recent, and conventional development
assistance is emphasized.
In light of the Mozambican and Tanzanian REDD documents, post-
national practices can be considered an outcome of global climate governance
practices, which include global standards, covering marketization, democrati-
zation and civil society participation, and governments’ attempts to keep their
established practices. Postnational practices reﬂect the current state of affairs in
global climate and development regimes. Clearly IOs, and the WB in particular,
put relatively strong pressure on REDD target countries via R-PPs to adapt market
practices in REDD+, as the Mozambican case indicates; their overall role in the
realization of REDD+ governance as an emerging practice is obscure. Therefore,
although our major interest has been in how a global initiative becomes trans-
formed into national practices, the process is actually bidirectional; the discussion
addressing the FVA in the UNFCCC is a clear example of interaction in the adapta-
tion of different domestic mitigation approaches within global climate gover-
nance. The compromise reached in Bonn in June 2015 seems to suggest a ﬂexible
approach that gives relatively large latitude for instituting national practices.
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